Alan Carter
University of Glasgow, Philosophy, Emeritus
Abstract: The article defends the forms of civil disobedience currently practised by environmental protesters. It reviews the justifications of civil disobedience by Dworkin, Rawls and Singer, and finds them more or less wanting. A new... more
Abstract: The article defends the forms of civil disobedience currently practised by environmental protesters. It reviews the justifications of civil disobedience by Dworkin, Rawls and Singer, and finds them more or less wanting. A new and more extensive justification is provided on the basis of our duties to prevent harm befalling future generations.
Three interlocking features appear to underpin Rawls's justification of political compliance within the context of political liberalism: namely, a specific territory; a specific society; and a specific conception of what it is to be... more
Three interlocking features appear to underpin Rawls's justification of political compliance within the context of political liberalism: namely, a specific territory; a specific society; and a specific conception of what it is to be reasonable. When any one feature is subject to critical ...
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While it is widely agreed that the infliction upon innocents of needless pain is immoral, many have argued that, even though nonhuman animals act as if they feel pain, there is no reason to think that they actually suffer painful... more
While it is widely agreed that the infliction upon innocents of needless pain is immoral, many have argued that, even though nonhuman animals act as if they feel pain, there is no reason to think that they actually suffer painful experiences. And if our actions only appear to cause nonhuman animals pain, then such actions are not immoral. On the basis of the claim that certain behavioural responses to organismic harm are maladaptive, whereas the ability to feel pain is itself adaptive, this article argues that the experience of pain should be viewed as the proximate cause of such occasionally maladaptive behaviour. But as nonhuman animals also display such maladaptive traits, we have reason to conclude that they feel pain. Hence, we have reason to hold that it is indeed possible to inflict needless pain on nonhuman animals, which would be immoral.
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Taylor and Francis Ltd FCRI7105.sgm 10.1080/136982304000235994 Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 1369-8230 (print)/0000-0000 (online) Original Article 2004 Taylor and Francis Ltd 71000000Spring 2004... more
Taylor and Francis Ltd FCRI7105.sgm 10.1080/136982304000235994 Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 1369-8230 (print)/0000-0000 (online) Original Article 2004 Taylor and Francis Ltd 71000000Spring 2004 AlanCarter Dept. of Philosophy, Campus Box ...
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There are two different ways in which an egalitarian might evaluate momentary distributions. This suggests two different egalitarian theories, with each theory focusing upon a different value. However, there may well be reason for... more
There are two different ways in which an egalitarian might evaluate momentary distributions. This suggests two different egalitarian theories, with each theory focusing upon a different value. However, there may well be reason for refusing to make a choice between these theories, and recognizing both values, instead. But this would suggest that egalitarianism may be more pluralist than has generally been presupposed.
Research Interests: Political Economy, Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Ethics, Political Theory, and 10 moreEquality Studies, Political Science, Politics, Egalitarianism, Political Theory (Political Science), Equality, Social and Political Philosophy, Contemporary Political Philosophy, Political theory (Philosophy), and Contemporary Political Theory
Abstract: This article argues that the seemingly immoral implications of the Non-Identity Problem can be avoided by employing a re-conceptualisation of ‘to harm’, namely a disjunctive one. The re-conceptualisation proposed retains what... more
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This article argues that the seemingly immoral implications of the Non-Identity Problem can be avoided by employing a re-conceptualisation of ‘to harm’, namely a disjunctive one. The re-conceptualisation proposed retains what is of value in the standard conceptualisation while also allowing us to claim coherently that we are able to harm distant future generations by adopting certain policies, even when those policies determine the identities of people in the distant future.
This article argues that the seemingly immoral implications of the Non-Identity Problem can be avoided by employing a re-conceptualisation of ‘to harm’, namely a disjunctive one. The re-conceptualisation proposed retains what is of value in the standard conceptualisation while also allowing us to claim coherently that we are able to harm distant future generations by adopting certain policies, even when those policies determine the identities of people in the distant future.
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Abstract: The article considers two different, yet related, theoretical approaches that could be employed to ground the anarchist critique of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary practice, and thus of the state in general: the State-Primacy... more
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The article considers two different, yet related, theoretical approaches that could be employed to ground the anarchist critique of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary practice, and thus of the state in general: the State-Primacy Theory and the Quadruplex Theory. The State-Primacy Theory appears to be consistent with several of Bakunin's claims about the state. However, the Quadruplex Theory might, in fact, turn out to be no less consistent with Bakunin's claims than the State-Primacy Theory. In addition, the Quadruplex Theory seems no less capable of supporting the anarchist critique of Marxism-Leninism than is the State-Primacy Theory. The article concludes by considering two possible refinements that might be made to the Quadrupex Theory.
The article considers two different, yet related, theoretical approaches that could be employed to ground the anarchist critique of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary practice, and thus of the state in general: the State-Primacy Theory and the Quadruplex Theory. The State-Primacy Theory appears to be consistent with several of Bakunin's claims about the state. However, the Quadruplex Theory might, in fact, turn out to be no less consistent with Bakunin's claims than the State-Primacy Theory. In addition, the Quadruplex Theory seems no less capable of supporting the anarchist critique of Marxism-Leninism than is the State-Primacy Theory. The article concludes by considering two possible refinements that might be made to the Quadrupex Theory.
Research Interests: Political Sociology, Political Economy, Philosophy, Applied Philosophy, Political Philosophy, and 31 moreEthics, Legitimacy and Authority, Political Participation, Feminist Theory, Political Theory, Marxism, Political Ecology, Feminist Philosophy, Political Science, Sexuality, Anarchism, Politics, Gender, Anarchist Studies, Environmental Political Theory, Political Legitimacy, Sigmund Freud, Contemporary Social Theory, Political Theory (Political Science), Michel Foucault, Environmental political theory (Philosophy), Social and Political Philosophy, Solidarity Economy, Post-left anarchism, Contemporary Political Philosophy, Political theory (Philosophy), Contemporary Political Theory, Green Anarchism, Theories of Socialism, Antiglobalization Social Movements, and Latin American feminisms
Abstract There has been a process of moral extensionism within environmental ethics from anthropocentrism, through zoocentrism, to ecocentrism. This article maps key elements of that process, and concludes that each of these ethical... more
Abstract
There has been a process of moral extensionism within environmental ethics from anthropocentrism, through zoocentrism, to ecocentrism. This article maps key elements of that process, and concludes that each of these ethical positions fails as a fully adequate, environmentalist ethic, and does so because of an implicit assumption that is common within normative theory. This notwithstanding, each position may well contribute a value. The problem that then arises is how to trade off those values against each other when they conflict. The solution here proposed is to employ multidimensional isovalue-contours along with a multidimensional practicability-frontier. This would result in a rich, value-pluralist environmentalist ethic that enjoined different outcomes to those enjoined by purely anthropocentric, zoocentric or ecocentric ethics.
There has been a process of moral extensionism within environmental ethics from anthropocentrism, through zoocentrism, to ecocentrism. This article maps key elements of that process, and concludes that each of these ethical positions fails as a fully adequate, environmentalist ethic, and does so because of an implicit assumption that is common within normative theory. This notwithstanding, each position may well contribute a value. The problem that then arises is how to trade off those values against each other when they conflict. The solution here proposed is to employ multidimensional isovalue-contours along with a multidimensional practicability-frontier. This would result in a rich, value-pluralist environmentalist ethic that enjoined different outcomes to those enjoined by purely anthropocentric, zoocentric or ecocentric ethics.
Research Interests: Political Economy, Philosophy, Applied Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Ethics, and 19 moreEnvironmental Philosophy, Normative Ethics, Applied Ethics, Political Theory, Axiology, Political Ecology, Political Campaigns, Political Science, Environmental Ethics, Environmental Political Theory, Ethical Theory, Consequentialism, Utilitarianism, Environmental political theory (Philosophy), Environmental ethics (Philosophy) (Philosophy), Social and Political Philosophy, Contemporary Political Philosophy, Political theory (Philosophy), and Contemporary Political Theory
Abstract: Two paradoxes within population ethics—Derek Parfit’s famous Mere Addition Paradox and Michael Huemer’s seemingly stronger variant upon it, “the Benign Addition Proof”, which seems to derive from the work of Torbjörn... more
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Two paradoxes within population ethics—Derek Parfit’s famous Mere Addition Paradox and Michael Huemer’s seemingly stronger variant upon it, “the Benign Addition Proof”, which seems to derive from the work of Torbjörn Tännsjö—both appear to lead inexorably to the Repugnant Conclusion. In this article I show how the Mere Addition Paradox, the Benign Addition “Proof” and the Repugnant Conclusion can all be successfully avoided. In the process of so doing, I defend an indirect, multidimensional value theory that incorporates plural contributory values, each contributing diminishing marginal overall value.
Two paradoxes within population ethics—Derek Parfit’s famous Mere Addition Paradox and Michael Huemer’s seemingly stronger variant upon it, “the Benign Addition Proof”, which seems to derive from the work of Torbjörn Tännsjö—both appear to lead inexorably to the Repugnant Conclusion. In this article I show how the Mere Addition Paradox, the Benign Addition “Proof” and the Repugnant Conclusion can all be successfully avoided. In the process of so doing, I defend an indirect, multidimensional value theory that incorporates plural contributory values, each contributing diminishing marginal overall value.
Research Interests: Philosophy, Applied Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Ethics, Environmental Philosophy, and 10 moreNormative Ethics, Applied Ethics, Political Theory, Axiology, Environmental Ethics, Ethical Theory, Consequentialism, Utilitarianism, Value theory (Philosophy), and Environmental ethics (Philosophy) (Philosophy)
Abstract: The most sophisticated philosophical defence of Marx’s theory of history – G.A. Cohen’s – deploys functional explanations in a manner that accords explanatory primacy to technological development. In contrast, an anarchist... more
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The most sophisticated philosophical defence of Marx’s theory of history – G.A. Cohen’s – deploys functional explanations in a manner that accords explanatory primacy to technological development. In contrast, an anarchist theory can be developed that accords explanatory primacy to the state. It is, however, possible to develop a theory of history that accords explanatory primacy neither to the development of technology nor to the state but which nevertheless possesses the explanatory power of both the Marxist and the anarchist theories. Such a theory can also provide the foundations for a radical environmentalist political theory.
The most sophisticated philosophical defence of Marx’s theory of history – G.A. Cohen’s – deploys functional explanations in a manner that accords explanatory primacy to technological development. In contrast, an anarchist theory can be developed that accords explanatory primacy to the state. It is, however, possible to develop a theory of history that accords explanatory primacy neither to the development of technology nor to the state but which nevertheless possesses the explanatory power of both the Marxist and the anarchist theories. Such a theory can also provide the foundations for a radical environmentalist political theory.
Research Interests: Political Economy, Philosophy, Applied Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Ethics, and 26 moreEnvironmental Philosophy, Legitimacy and Authority, Applied Ethics, Political Theory, Marxism, Critical Geopolitics, Political Ecology, Environmental Studies, Marxism and Ecology, Political Science, Anarchism, Environmental Ethics, Environmental Political Theory, Political Legitimacy, Environmental Politics, Postcolonial Theory, Environmental Justice, Environmental political theory (Philosophy), Social and Political Philosophy, Post-left anarchism, Contemporary Political Philosophy, Contemporary Political Theory, Green Anarchism, Critical Development Studies, Climate Politics, and Global (North/South) Environmental Politics
Abstract: Genuine altruism would appear to be incompatible with evolutionary theory. And yet altruistic behavior would seem to occur, at least on occasion. This article first considers a game-theoretical attempt at solving this seeming... more
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Genuine altruism would appear to be incompatible with evolutionary theory. And yet altruistic behavior would seem to occur, at least on occasion. This article first considers a game-theoretical attempt at solving this seeming paradox, before considering a "group selectionist" approach. Neither approach, as they stand, would seem to render genuine, as opposed to reciprocal, altruism compatible with the theory of evolution. The article concludes by offering an alternative game-theoretical solution to the problem of altruism.
Genuine altruism would appear to be incompatible with evolutionary theory. And yet altruistic behavior would seem to occur, at least on occasion. This article first considers a game-theoretical attempt at solving this seeming paradox, before considering a "group selectionist" approach. Neither approach, as they stand, would seem to render genuine, as opposed to reciprocal, altruism compatible with the theory of evolution. The article concludes by offering an alternative game-theoretical solution to the problem of altruism.
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Abstract: As Rawls’s thought evolved from his 1958 article ‘Justice as Fairness’ to the 1996 edition of his book Political Liberalism, his response to the problem of political compliance would seem to have undergone a number of changes.... more
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As Rawls’s thought evolved from his 1958 article ‘Justice as Fairness’ to the 1996 edition of his book Political Liberalism, his response to the problem of political compliance would seem to have undergone a number of changes. This article critically evaluates the development of Rawls’s various explicit or implied arguments that serve to justify compliance to just social arrangements, and concludes that the problem of political compliance remains without any cogent solution within the vast corpus of Rawls’s work.
As Rawls’s thought evolved from his 1958 article ‘Justice as Fairness’ to the 1996 edition of his book Political Liberalism, his response to the problem of political compliance would seem to have undergone a number of changes. This article critically evaluates the development of Rawls’s various explicit or implied arguments that serve to justify compliance to just social arrangements, and concludes that the problem of political compliance remains without any cogent solution within the vast corpus of Rawls’s work.
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Abstract: Three interlocking features appear to underpin Rawls’s justification of political compliance within the context of political liberalism: namely, a specific territory; a specific society; and a specific conception of what it is... more
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Three interlocking features appear to underpin Rawls’s justification of political compliance within the context of political liberalism: namely, a specific territory; a specific society; and a specific conception of what it is to be reasonable. When any one feature is subject to critical examination, while presupposing that the other two are acceptable, Rawls’s argument for political compliance may seem persuasive. But when all three features are critically examined together, his justification of political compliance within political liberalism can be seen to lack cogency. Thus, political compliance fails to be justified by a free-standing political liberalism.
Three interlocking features appear to underpin Rawls’s justification of political compliance within the context of political liberalism: namely, a specific territory; a specific society; and a specific conception of what it is to be reasonable. When any one feature is subject to critical examination, while presupposing that the other two are acceptable, Rawls’s argument for political compliance may seem persuasive. But when all three features are critically examined together, his justification of political compliance within political liberalism can be seen to lack cogency. Thus, political compliance fails to be justified by a free-standing political liberalism.
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Abstract: Recently, Michael Huemer has attempted, in this journal, to refute egalitarianism. His strategy consists in considering three possible worlds (one with an egalitarian distribution of well-being, one with an inegalitarian... more
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Recently, Michael Huemer has attempted, in this journal, to refute egalitarianism. His strategy consists in considering three possible worlds (one with an egalitarian distribution of well-being, one with an inegalitarian distribution at every moment but with an egalitarian distribution overall, and one with an inegalitarian distribution at every moment as well as overall), dividing each of them into two temporal segments, then showing that none of the temporal segments possesses greater moral value than any other, and finally concluding that the three possible worlds are morally equal. The present article rebuts Huemer's critique of egalitarianism first, and most importantly, by showing that his core argument rests upon an equivocation, and second, by rebutting his supplementary arguments. In the process, egalitarianism is shown to incorporate more values than has traditionally been presumed
Recently, Michael Huemer has attempted, in this journal, to refute egalitarianism. His strategy consists in considering three possible worlds (one with an egalitarian distribution of well-being, one with an inegalitarian distribution at every moment but with an egalitarian distribution overall, and one with an inegalitarian distribution at every moment as well as overall), dividing each of them into two temporal segments, then showing that none of the temporal segments possesses greater moral value than any other, and finally concluding that the three possible worlds are morally equal. The present article rebuts Huemer's critique of egalitarianism first, and most importantly, by showing that his core argument rests upon an equivocation, and second, by rebutting his supplementary arguments. In the process, egalitarianism is shown to incorporate more values than has traditionally been presumed
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Abstract: This article considers several of the most famous arguments for our being under a moral obligation to preserve species, and finds them all wanting. The most promising argument for preserving all varieties of species might seem... more
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This article considers several of the most famous arguments for our being under a moral obligation to preserve species, and finds them all wanting. The most promising argument for preserving all varieties of species might seem to be an aesthetic one. Unfortunately, the suggestion that the moral basis for the preservation of species should be construed as similar to the moral basis for the preservation of a work of art seems to presume (what are now widely regarded as) erroneous conceptualizations of ‘‘species’’. The article concludes by arguing that more promising approaches to how ‘‘species’’ ought to be conceptualized suggest that the preservation of species should be construed as of far greater aesthetic importance than is suggested by focusing upon the preservation of any single work of art. Hence, if we have a moral obligation to preserve a single artwork, then we have a far greater moral obligation to preserve species than has often been presumed.
This article considers several of the most famous arguments for our being under a moral obligation to preserve species, and finds them all wanting. The most promising argument for preserving all varieties of species might seem to be an aesthetic one. Unfortunately, the suggestion that the moral basis for the preservation of species should be construed as similar to the moral basis for the preservation of a work of art seems to presume (what are now widely regarded as) erroneous conceptualizations of ‘‘species’’. The article concludes by arguing that more promising approaches to how ‘‘species’’ ought to be conceptualized suggest that the preservation of species should be construed as of far greater aesthetic importance than is suggested by focusing upon the preservation of any single work of art. Hence, if we have a moral obligation to preserve a single artwork, then we have a far greater moral obligation to preserve species than has often been presumed.
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Abstract: Many maximizing normative theories are monistic in resting upon one core value. But such theories generate highly counter-intuitive implications. This is especially clear in the case of hedonistic utilitarianism. But an... more
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Many maximizing normative theories are monistic in resting upon one core value. But such theories generate highly counter-intuitive implications. This is especially clear in the case of hedonistic utilitarianism. But an analysis of why we find those implications counter-intuitive implies that we ought to subscribe to a plurality of values. For example, the Repugnant Conclusion implies that we should value a high level of average happiness, while the Problem of the Ecstatic Psychopath implies that we should value either a large quantity of total happiness or a large number of worthwhile lives. The problems posed by pleasure-wizards, on the other hand, imply that we should include a non-utilitarian value: namely, equality. And only when such values are kept in play simultaneously can the Repugnant Conclusion, the Problem of the Ecstatic Psychopath and the problems posed by pleasure-wizards all be avoided, thereby demonstrating the superiority of pluralist over monistic normative theories.
Many maximizing normative theories are monistic in resting upon one core value. But such theories generate highly counter-intuitive implications. This is especially clear in the case of hedonistic utilitarianism. But an analysis of why we find those implications counter-intuitive implies that we ought to subscribe to a plurality of values. For example, the Repugnant Conclusion implies that we should value a high level of average happiness, while the Problem of the Ecstatic Psychopath implies that we should value either a large quantity of total happiness or a large number of worthwhile lives. The problems posed by pleasure-wizards, on the other hand, imply that we should include a non-utilitarian value: namely, equality. And only when such values are kept in play simultaneously can the Repugnant Conclusion, the Problem of the Ecstatic Psychopath and the problems posed by pleasure-wizards all be avoided, thereby demonstrating the superiority of pluralist over monistic normative theories.
Research Interests: Political Economy, Philosophy, Applied Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Ethics, and 11 moreEnvironmental Philosophy, Normative Ethics, Applied Ethics, Political Theory, Axiology, Environmental Ethics, Ethical Theory, Consequentialism, Utilitarianism, Environmental Virtue Ethics, and Environmental ethics (Philosophy) (Philosophy)
Abstract This article defends value pluralism against the charge of incoherence, and indicates one form that a coherent pluralist ethic might take: namely, one deploying multidimensional isovalue planes combined with a multidimensional... more
Abstract
This article defends value pluralism against the charge of incoherence, and indicates one form that a coherent pluralist ethic might take: namely, one deploying multidimensional isovalue planes combined with a multidimensional practicability frontier in order to determine the best outcome. However, different individuals could be expected to weight their values differently such that the gradients of their respective isovalue planes would be quite dissimilar. A Humean projectivist metaethic can explain how different persons’ isovalue planes may be expected to come into greater alignment, thereby revealing a compatibility between error-theoretic projectivism and pluralism.
This article defends value pluralism against the charge of incoherence, and indicates one form that a coherent pluralist ethic might take: namely, one deploying multidimensional isovalue planes combined with a multidimensional practicability frontier in order to determine the best outcome. However, different individuals could be expected to weight their values differently such that the gradients of their respective isovalue planes would be quite dissimilar. A Humean projectivist metaethic can explain how different persons’ isovalue planes may be expected to come into greater alignment, thereby revealing a compatibility between error-theoretic projectivism and pluralism.
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Abstract: By distinguishing between contributory values and overall value, and by arguing that contributory values are variable values insofar as they contribute diminishing marginal overall value, this article helps to establish the... more
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By distinguishing between contributory values and overall value, and by arguing that contributory values are variable values insofar as they contribute diminishing marginal overall value, this article helps to establish the superiority of a certain kind of maximizing, value-pluralist axiology over both sufficientarianism and prioritarianism, as well as over all varieties of value-monism, including utilitarianism and pure egalitarianism.
By distinguishing between contributory values and overall value, and by arguing that contributory values are variable values insofar as they contribute diminishing marginal overall value, this article helps to establish the superiority of a certain kind of maximizing, value-pluralist axiology over both sufficientarianism and prioritarianism, as well as over all varieties of value-monism, including utilitarianism and pure egalitarianism.
Research Interests: Political Economy, Philosophy, Applied Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Ethics, and 11 moreEnvironmental Philosophy, Normative Ethics, Applied Ethics, Political Theory, Axiology, Political Science, Environmental Ethics, Ethical Theory, Consequentialism, Utilitarianism, and Environmental ethics (Philosophy) (Philosophy)
Abstract: This article begins by presenting in summary form a multidimensional axiology that distinguishes contributory values from overall value, and which holds that those contributory values contribute diminishing marginal overall... more
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This article begins by presenting in summary form a multidimensional axiology that distinguishes contributory values from overall value, and which holds that those contributory values contribute diminishing marginal overall value. In the second part, a number of objections to this axiology are considered and then rebutted.
This article begins by presenting in summary form a multidimensional axiology that distinguishes contributory values from overall value, and which holds that those contributory values contribute diminishing marginal overall value. In the second part, a number of objections to this axiology are considered and then rebutted.
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Abstract: This article shows both classical utilitarianism and egalitarianism to be inadequate normative theories. It also provides grounds for rejecting prioritarianism. A more adequate moral theory, however, would not dispense with... more
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This article shows both classical utilitarianism and egalitarianism to be inadequate normative theories. It also provides grounds for rejecting prioritarianism. A more adequate moral theory, however, would not dispense with what classical utilitarianism and egalitarianism respectively value. Rather, it would incorporate both values. An indication of how this might be achieved is provided.
This article shows both classical utilitarianism and egalitarianism to be inadequate normative theories. It also provides grounds for rejecting prioritarianism. A more adequate moral theory, however, would not dispense with what classical utilitarianism and egalitarianism respectively value. Rather, it would incorporate both values. An indication of how this might be achieved is provided.
